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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
The Ada County Prosecuting Attorney, as Plaintiff, has appealed the district court's
ruling that Defendant Property Nine Thousand Four Hundred Fifteen and 64/100 Dollars
($9,415.64) United States Currency seized from Claimant's Chase Bank checking account
is not subject to forfeiture under the Idaho Controlled Substances Act.

B.

Course of Proceedings.

Appellant's brief accurately states the course of proceedings in this case and
Claimant-Respondent has nothing to correct or add to Appellant's account.

C.

Statement of Facts.

As this appeal concerns only the money seized by law enforcement from Claimant's

bank account, much of the testimony from the hearing and factual history as provided by
Appellant is incomplete, inaccurate, or irrelevant to the issues raised on appeal. The
complete account of all the evidence introduced at trial, and therefore relevant to this
appeal, are as follows:
At trial the Plaintiff called two witnesses. The first, Deputy Lowry of the Ada
County Sheriffs Office, testified that on August 20, 2014, he was working patrol and
interdiction that day out on the freeway. Tr. p. 24, LL. 19-20. While on duty, he stopped
Claimant on the freeway for speeding and failure to signal for five seconds. Tr. p. 24, L.
15-25 and p. 25, LL. 1-12. (No testimony was offered as to which freeway or where the
stop occurred nor is it mentioned in any of the exhibits admitted at trial.) A subsequent
search of Claimant's vehicle yielded a large amount of methamphetamines, marijuana
and money. Tr. p. 25, LL. 15-19. Appellant introduced Exhibit 1, Claimant's Judgment of
Conviction, through Deputy Lowry which was admitted into evidence. This summarizes
the entirety of the testimony offered by Deputy Lowry.
Next the Plaintiff called Detective Roberson of the Ada County Sheriffs Office. He
testified that on August 20, 2014, he interviewed Claimant at the Sheriffs Office following
Claimant's arrest. Tr. p. 30, LL. 18-21. During questioning, Claimant told Roberson he
was currently unemployed and looking for work. Tr. p. 34, LL. 13-25 and p. 35, LL. 1-5.
That was meaningful to Roberson because Claimant was found with $12,000 in cash
during the traffic stop. Tr. p. 35, LL. 6-12. Roberson did not testify at any point in the
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trial that Claimant's unemployment was concerning to him in relation to the money
eventually seized from Claimant's bank account. Further, Roberson offered no testimony
that he had ever questioned Claimant about the length of his unemployment, when the
period of unemployment had begun, or what Claimant did for employment prior to
becoming unemployed.
After interviewing Claimant, Roberson took him to the Ada County jail for booking.
Tr. p. 37, 16-18. He then returned to the Ada County narcotics unit to review any phone
calls Claimant might make from the booking area of the jail. Tr. p. 37, LL. 8-23. In one
phone call, Claimant told someone named Aaron to empty his bank account, to put half
the money on his books and to take the other half to Linda, because he was afraid it would
be confiscated. Ex. 3, p. 17, LL. 9-25 and p. 18, LL. 1-8. In a second phone call, Claimant
told an unknown female to empty his bank account and to transfer it to anyone of her
choosing. Ex. 3, p. 40, LL. 21-25 and p. 41, LL. 1-25. However, Claimant also told her in
that call, "So, there's $10,000 in the bank that we got to get out of there ... I can prove
the income but they're still going to take it, you know." Ex. 3, p. 43, LL. 17-21

(emphasis added).

Roberson stated on direct exam that he included Claimant's

statements about his fear of the bank money being confiscated in his affidavit for a seizure
warrant; however, he admitted on cross exam that he failed to include Claimant's
statement that he could prove the legal source of the money in that affidavit. Tr. p. 69,
LL. 19-25 and p. 70, 1-14. Roberson also admitted on cross exam that there could have
been many reasons why Claimant feared the bank money would be confiscated other than
because it was drug money. Tr. p. 82, LL. 14-20. He also admitted that at no time did
Claimant ever state in any of the monitored phone calls that the bank money was related
to drugs in any way. Tr. p. 82, LL. 21-25 and p. 83, LL. 1-5. Exhibit 3, Transcript of the
recorded phone calls, was then admitted through Roberson.
After reviewing these calls, Roberson sought and obtained a seizure warrant which
he served on Chase Bank where Claimant had his account. Tr. p. 44, LL. 1-17. On August
27, 2014, Chase Bank issued a cashier's check to the Ada County Sheriffs Office for the
amount of $9,415.64, the amount of money in Claimant's account at that time. Tr. p. 44,
LL. 23-25 and p. 45, LL. 1-12.
Roberson then testified that in August, 2014, Claimant had traveled to Ogden or
the Ogden area. Tr. p. 51, LL. 5-6. This was significant to the detective because "I-84 is a
CLAIMANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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corridor for drug trafficking between Salt Lake and Boise." Tr. p. 51, LL. 14-15. However,
on questioning from the court, the detective admitted that he "may have misspoke," and
that I-84 is really just a travel route between the two cities that is also sometimes used by
narcotics traffickers. Tr. p. 52, LL. 5-25 and p. 53 LL. 1-11. He further admitted to the
court that his characterization of I-84 as a "drug corridor" was not the reason Claimant's
trip to Ogden was significant to him. Tr. p. 53, LL. 1-11.
During Detective Roberson's direct exam he testified that he has reviewed bank
records when performing investigations and that he had reviewed Claimant's bank
records as part of this investigation. Tr. p. 45, LL. 13-18. Plaintiff introduced Exhibit 4,
Claimant's bank records, which was admitted into evidence. Tr. p. 46, LL. 2-3. The entire
testimony elicited from Detective Roberson relative to Exhibit 4 is as follows:
"The beginning balance (in the account) was negative $161.04." Tr. p. 47, LL.
2-3;
"On July 16th, 2014, there was a deposit in the amount of $26,288.19." Tr. pl.
47, LL. 9-10;
"... there appear to be expenses outside of Boise ... " Tr. p. 48, LL. 7-8;
"There is a purchase on August 21st, 2014, at the IHOP in Ogden, Utah." Tr. p.
53, LL. 19-20;
" .. .I had knowledge that Mr. DeMint was in Ogden specifically meeting v\rith his
source of supply on the 20th of August." Do you know where they were meeting

in Ogden? "I do from the bank statements, yes." Tr. p. 56, LL. 1-6;
At no point in the trial did Roberson ever testify, nor did Plaintiff offer any evidence that
law enforcement ever investigated any bank records to determine the source of the
deposits to Claimant's account. No evidence was offered that any investigation was done
to determine whether the sources of the deposits on Claimant's bank records were
legitimate or not.
On its own review of Exhibit 4, the district court observed a $4,000 withdrawal on
July 17, 2014, a $5,000 withdrawal on July 21, 2014, and a $4,500 v\rithdrawal on July 30,
2014, all of which occurred a month prior to Claimant's arrest. Tr. p. 59, LL. 19-25, and
p. 60, LL. 1-4.

Again, Plaintiff offered no evidence that Detective Roberson ever

intenriewed Claimant or othenvise investigated any of the deposits or withdrawals to the
account. This summarizes the entirety of Detective Roberson's testimony.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court erred in entering a directed verdict

Mr.

DeMint's favor.
2.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that Defendant property Nine

Thousand Four Hundred Fifteen and 64/100 Dollars ($9,415.64) United States Currency
is not subject to forfeiture per Idaho Code§ 37-2744 and the Idaho Uniform Controlled
Substances Act, Idaho Code§§ 37-2701, et seq.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the case of a court trial rather than a jury trial, the proper motion for a party to
make, instead of a motion for directed verdict, is a motion for involuntary dismissal.

Durrant v. Quality First 1Yiarketing, 127 Idaho 558, 559, 903 P.2d 147, 148 (Ct. App.
1995). As in Durrant, this case having been tried to the court without a jury, this Court
should therefore treat the district court's grant of Claimant's motion for directed verdict
as a grant of a motion for involuntary dismissal. Id.
Upon appeal of a granting of a motion for involuntary dismissal, this Court "must
view all of the (nonmoving party's) evidence as being true and afford every inference
favorable to the (nonmoving party) that legitimately may be drawn from such evidence."

Id. at 560. This is the same standard as should be applied to motions for directed verdict.
See General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849,855,979 P.2d 1207,
1213 (1999) citing Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 297, 900 P.2d 201, 205 (Ct. App.
1995) ("When reviewing the disposition of a motion for a directed verdict... [this Court]
must determine whether, admitting the truth of the adverse evidence and drawing every
legitimate inference most favorably to the opposing party, there exists substantial
evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury.")
The granting of a motion for involuntary dismissal, like a motion for directed
verdict, is subject to the "substantial evidence test." Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007,
1010, 712 P.2d 708, 711 (Idaho App. 1985). The "substantial evidence test" requires that
the evidence "be of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could
conclude that a verdict in favor of the party against whom the motion is made is proper."

CLAIMANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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General Auto Parts, 132 Idaho at 855, citing All v. Smith's Management Corp., 109 Idaho
479,480, 708 P.2d 884, 885 (1985).
IV.

ARGUMENT
The District Court correctly granted Claimant's motion for directed verdict, now
treated as a motion for involuntary dismissal, because the court applied the correct
standard of proof to Plaintiffs evidence and because Plaintiffs evidence, even when
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, did not meet the standard of proof.
A.

The District Court applied the correct standard of proof of
preponderance of the evidence to Plaintiff's evidence.

"Forfeiture proceedings shall be civil actions against the property subject to
forfeiture and the standard of proof shall be preponderance of the evidence." Idaho Code
§ 37-2744(d). The Idaho Court of Appeals examined this standard even more closely in

Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement By and Through Richardson v. $34, ooo United States
Currency. In that case, the claimant argued that a reasonable doubt standard should be
applied to civil forfeiture cases due to their penal nature. In response, the Court stated:
When applying LC. § 37-2744, the trial court required that the state show
by a preponderance of evidence that the seized money was used in a manner
that violated the statute. The court stated:
The forfeiture statute explicitly adopts a preponderance of
evidence standard. While this is substantially more rigorous
than the 'probable cause' standards applied in federal
forfeiture proceedings, 21 U.S. C.A. 881(a)(6), the Court is
troubled by the use of a civil standard of proof in proceedings
which are clearly penal in nature. Indeed, the state would not
have prevailed in this proceeding had it been required to
prove its case by 'clear and convincing evidence,' or 'beyond a
reasonable doubt.' However, the legislature has spoken on
this issue, and the court is not persuaded that it can ignore the
statutory directive of LC. 37-2744.
We, too, cannot ignore the directive of LC.§ 37-2744. Established case law
indicates that a majority of states have adopted and upheld an evidentiary
standard below reasonable doubt in civil forfeiture proceedings, and that
most have adopted a preponderance of evidence standard. See State v.
Spooner, 520 So.2d 336, 360 (La. 1988). Also, we note that the standard
Idaho imposes is more stringent than the finding of probable cause required
in forfeiture proceedings under federal law. See 21 U.S. C. § 881(a)(6); 19
U.S. C. § 1615; United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808
F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir. 1987).
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Idaho Dept. of Law Enforcement By and Through Richardson v. $34, ooo United States
Currency, 121 Idaho 211, 216, 824 P.2d 142. 147 (Idaho App. 1991). It is therefore wellestablished in Idaho that the standard of proof in civil forfeiture cases is preponderance
of the evidence.
Preponderance of the evidence is defined as:
Greater weight of evidence, or evidence which is more credible and
convincing to the mind. Button v. Metcalf, 80 Wis. 193, 49 N.W. 809. That
which best accords with reason and probability. U.S. v. McCaskill, D.C. Fla.,
200 F. 332. The word 'preponderance' means something more than
'weight'; it denotes a superiority of weight, or outweighing. The words are
not synonymous, but substantially different. There is generally a 'weight' of
evidence on each side in case of contested facts. But juries cannot properly
act upon the weight of evidence, in favor of the one having the onus, unless
it overbear, in some degree, the weight upon the other side. Mathes v.
Aggler & Musser Seed Co., 178 P.713, 715, 179 Cal. 697; Barnes v. Phillips,
184 Ind. 415, 111 N.E. 419.
Black's Law Dictionary. "A preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence shows
something to be more probably true than not."

In re Beyer v. State of Idaho,

Transportation Dept., 155 Idaho 40, 45,304 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Ct. App. 2013) citing Oxley
v. Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476,481, 80 P.3d 1077, 1082 (2003).
In this case, the district court applied the correct standard of proof of
preponderance of the evidence. First, the district court stated on the record that it
understood and was following the correct standard: "So on the status of the proof and the
status of the evidence that was presented to me, there is not sufficient evidence to draw
any conclusions to a preponderance of the evidence or othervvise that the cash in
question, that the cash in the bank. .. was the product of drug or prohibited money." Tr. p.
100, LL. 18-25 and p. 101, LL. 1-3 (emphasis added).
Second, the district court appropriately looked at all the evidence presented by
Plaintiff at the trial, and only the evidence presented at trial. As shown above, it rendered
its decision on" ... the evidence that was presented to me ... " at trial. The district court
was restricted to only the evidence presented at trial and correctly relied on only the
evidence presented.

Plaintiffs arguments regarding various theories, suppositions,

assumptions, or hunches about where Claimant's bank money came from are not
evidence. Idaho Standard Jury Instructions. This Court, in reviewing the evidence in
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this case, is subject to the same restrictions and must decide this case based only on the
evidence presented at triaL Durrant, 127 Idaho at 559-560.
Third, the evidence presented at trial is subject to the substantial evidence test,
which the district court correctly applied. Evidence is substantial if "it is of sufficient
quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the
(fact-finder) was proper." Hibbler, 109 Idaho at 1009-1010, citing Mann v. Safeway

Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974). Here, the court specifically
found that not only was there not substantial evidence, there was not sufficient evidence
to meet the preponderance burden. Tr. p. 100, LL. 20-21.
Our state's Supreme Court has clearly defined the trial court's duty and
responsibility when confronted with a motion for involuntary dismissal, as well as the
appellate court's level of deference it will give to the trial court's decision on such a
motion:
[W]hen a defendant moves for an involuntary dismissal at the close of the
plaintiffs presentation in a non-jury case, the court sits as a trier of fact and
is not required to construe all evidence and inferences to be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Keenan v. Brooks, 100
Idaho 823, 825, 606 P.2d 473, 475 (1980). The trial court 'is to weigh the
evidence, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itself where the
preponderance lies.' Id. A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside
on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co.,
Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002); I.R.C.P. 52(a). 'When
deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not
substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. It is the province of
the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of
witnesses.' Miller v. St.Alphonsus Reg'lMed. Ctr., Inc., 139 Idaho 825,832,
87 P.3d 934, 941 (2004) (citation omitted).

Cummings v. Stephens, 157 Idaho 348, 355, 336 P.3d 281, 288 (2014).

Although

Claimant in this case erroneously moved for a directed verdict rather than an involuntary
dismissal, this Court is to treat it as a motion for involuntary dismissal, as shown above,
making Cummings directly on point. Although on appeal this Court must view all of
Plaintiffs evidence presented at trial as true and afford Plaintiff every inference favorable
to Plaintiff that legitimately may be drawn from such evidence, the district court was not
under the same burden. Instead, the district court was only required to weigh the
evidence presented, resolve any conflicts in it, and decide for itself where the
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preponderance lies. The district court, as evidenced in its summation and ruling at the
end of the trial, did exactly that. Having done that, the trial court's findings and judgment
not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous." And while this Court
should draw all legitimate inferences from Plaintiffs evidence, this Court cannot
substitute its view of the facts for that of the district court in this case. Regarding the facts
and the evidence, this Court is to give deference to the district court inasmuch as the
district court was present for the presentation of the evidence and therefore in the best
position to read body language, listen to tone of voice, and judge the credibility of
·witnesses.
Plaintiff spends much of its brief discussing statements made by the district court
at trial like, "... you build a mountain for yourself that is almost insurmountable ... ," and
" ... the mountain road got significantly steeper ... " However, in so arguing Plaintiff is
making a mountain out of a molehill. Plaintiff wants to put itself in the district court's
mind and assume that the district court was applying a reasonable doubt standard.
However, at no time did the district court ever say anything about reasonable doubt. If
Plaintiff wants to assume what was in the court's mind based on comments made at the
close of evidence, one can just as easily assume the district court's comments were an
effort to compare Plaintiffs preponderance burden with that of probable cause, a much
lower burden, as explained above. Being that this case originated in a penal case where
the standard of probable cause is often the correct standard, the district court here could
just have easily been demonstrating to Plaintiff that a handful of facts that would suffice
for probable cause in that setting is not sufficient to meet the standard of preponderance
of the evidence in this civil case.
Further, by making the argument that the district court applied the wrong
standard, Plaintiff is simply trying to hide the fact that its evidence amounts to no more
than a molehill. For example:
a. Plaintiff claims in its brief that it presented evidence of the frequency of
Claimant's trips to a drug source location. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. A review of
the trial transcript yields no such evidence.
b. Plaintiff argues that Claimant received the bank money from selling meth.
Appellant's Brief, p. 13. There is no
There

in the record to support this.

no evidence that any investigation of the source of the bank money was
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made. Further, at no time did Claimant ever admit that the bank money was
the product of drug activity. Rather, he said, in a call that he apparently didn't
know was being monitored, "I can prove the income," a fact Detective Roberson
conveniently omitted from his sworn affidavit presented to a magistrate for a
seizure warrant.
c. Plaintiff asserts that Claimant's sole source of income was from distributing
meth. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. This is a mere assumption, not borne out by any
measure of sufficient evidence in the record. Claimant told Roberson on August
20 that he was unemployed.

However, Roberson did not ask him how long he'd

been unemployed, where he'd been working prior to becoming unemployed,
whether he had money saved in the bank, whether he was collecting
unemployment, whether he had any other source of income, etc. Even after
seizing the money in the bank, Roberson did not investigate the unemployment
issue.
d. Plaintiff argues that the "record shows no legitimate source of income" for
Claimant. Appellant's Brief, p. 14. In so arguing, Plaintiff either forgets that
Plaintiff alone bears the burden of proof, or seeks to distract this Court from
the scarcity of its evidence.
e. Plaintiff argues that "[d]espite being unemployed, Mr. DeMint made four large
deposits in the two months preceding his arrest." Appellant's Brief, p. 14. As
shown above, there is no evidence in the record regarding the length of
Claimant's unemployment and whether he was unemployed when those
deposits were made. In making this argument, Plaintiff misstates, overstates,
exaggerates, or misconstrues the evidence to prop up a weak case.

f. In its argument, Plaintiff points out four large deposits to Claimant's bank
account in July and August, 2014, and then states that each of these deposits
occurred shortly after a series of out-of-state purchases. Appellant's Brief, p.
14. A review of Exhibit 4 shows this simply is not true. Again, Plaintiff attempts
to inflate its limp case by puffing up the evidence.
g. Plaintiff argues that Claimant took six separate trips to California, Utah and
Nevada in July and August, 2014, which is "incongruous with the way most
people travel." Appellant's Brief, p. 14. There is no evidence on the travel issue.
CLAIMANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF I 9 of13

"More probably true than not," means exactly that - more than 50%, mor~ than
more than equally true.
must

means more than possibly true. It means Plaintiff

not just possess, a sufficient quantity and/ or quality of evidence to get over

the hump - not to prove that theirs is the only possibility but to prove that it is the best
possibility. In this case, the district court felt that the meager amount of evidence
presented by Plaintiff - after a full opportunity to present all the evidence it wished - did
not meet this burden, a burden that Plaintiff alone bore.
Plaintiff argues that the district court applied the wrong standard but Plaintiff does
not argue that the district court's findings of fact were erroneous. This is because Plaintiff
presented so little evidence, much of which was undisputed, and therefore there is no
erroneous argument to be made. "A trial court's findings of fact \Nill not be set aside on
appeal unless they are clearly erroneous ... 'When deciding whether findings of fact are
clearly erroneous, this Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial
court."' Cummings, 157 Idaho at 355.
B.

Even after admitting the truth of Plaintiff's evidence and drawing
every legitimate inference most favorably to Plaintiff, the
evidence fails to meet the standard of proof.

Plaintiffs burden at trial was to prove, to a preponderance of the evidence, that
Claimant's money in the bank was "used or intended for use in connection with the illegal
manufacture, distribution, dispensing, or possession of property" described in Idaho
Code§ 37-2744(a)(1), (2), (3), (5), (7), and/or (8). Idaho Code§ 37-2744(a)(6). Plaintiff
put on no evidence at trial that the bank money was ever used in the manufacture,
distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances. Plaintiff introduced evidence only of
possession of controlled substances; when law enforcement stopped and searched
Claimant on August 20, 2014, they found him in possession of nearly a pound of meth.
There was no evidence introduced that Claimant was selling the meth, meeting someone
to deliver the meth, or even sharing the meth with others. Indeed, the trafficking statute
under which Claimant pled guilty, contains no requirement that sale, delivery, or intent
to deliver be proven. State v. McIntosh, 368 P.3d 621, 625 (2016). Therefore, the only
question is whether the bank money seized by the State was ever used for the purpose of
possessing controlled substances.
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Out of the two witnesses Plaintiff called at trial, only Detective Roberson said
anything relative to the money in the bank The only testimony he provided about the
bank money was:
a. Claimant had expressed a fear that the bank money would be confiscated;
b. The beginning balance in the bank account was -$161.04;

c. There was a deposit on July 16, 2014 of $26,288.19;
d. The account appears to reflect expenses outside of Boise;
e. There was a purchase from the account at the Ogden IHOP on August 21, 2014.
However, on cross exam Detective Roberson admitted that in the same phone call
where the Claimant expressed fear that the bank money would be confiscated he also
expressed that he could legitimately account for the money. Roberson also admitted that
Claimant never mentioned anything about drugs or illegal activity related to the bank
money and that he had chosen to omit these details from his affidavit for the seizure
warrant for the money.
Regarding the large deposit on July 16, there was no evidence presented that
Roberson had done any kind of investigation to determine the source of that deposit.
There was no evidence that he reviewed any bank records, that he interviewed any bank
employees, that he interviewed Claimant, or did anything else to determine if the source
was licit or illicit. He testified on direct that Claimant told him the day of his arrest he
was unemployed but he admitted on cross that he hadn't inquired further, at that time or
after the discovery of the bank money, to determine when Claimant became unemployed
or whether he was unemployed at the time of the large deposit.
The rest of Roberson's testimony sheds no further light on the source of the bank
money or whether or not it was tied to drug activity. Roberson testified that the IHOP
purchase proves that Claimant was in Ogden on August 20, 2014, and the then testified
that he assumed that was where Claimant was meeting his source of meth supply.
However, Claimant did not testify, nor could he offer any evidence, that he was present in
Ogden on that date and witnessed Claimant meeting a drug supplier at the IHOP.
Further, even if Roberson could offer such evidence, the only evidence of the use of the
bank money was for pancakes, not a pound of meth.
On Plaintiffs counsel's urging, the district court observed three withdrawals of
$4,000, $5,000, and $4,500 on July 17, July
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and July 30, respectively. However,

there was no evidence presented whatsoever to show any purpose for the withdrawals.
the district court correctly pointed out that these withdrawals were

a

to Claimant's arrest.
As demonstrated above, there is no escaping the fact that Plaintiff put on a

relatively small amount of evidence at trial, some of which was contradicted by its own
witness. Even admitting all the evidence as true, and drawing all reasonable, legitimate
references therefrom, Plaintiff did not meet its burden of preponderance of the evidence.
Thinking so doesn't make it so. Plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to present all the
evidence it desired regarding the bank money, the district court applied the correct
standard of proof to the evidence, and the evidence came up lacking. The district court
made the correct decision in granting Claimant's motion.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Claimant-Respondent respectfully requests this
Court enter an order affirming the decision of the district court and awarding attorney
fees and costs to Claimant.

MAUK MILLER & HAWKINS, PLLC
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